Uncertainty Business Cycles - Really? by Rüdiger Bachmann & Christian Bayer
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES









We thank Nick Bloom for his discussion and Dirk Krüger, GiuseppeMoscarini, Gernot Müeller,Matthew
Shapiro as well as Eric Sims for their comments. We are grateful to seminar/meeting participants at
RWTH Aachen, the ASSA (San Francisco), Bundesbank, CESifoMacro Conference (2010), Cowles
Summer Conference (2009), CSEF (Capri), Duke, ESEM (Barcelona), ESSIM 2009, Georgetown,
Innsbruck, Konstanz Seminar on Monetary Theory¸˛and Policy, Mainz, Michigan-Ann Arbor, Minneapolis
FED, NBER Summer Institute (2009), SED (Istanbul), Universitá Ca’Foscari Venezia, VfS (Magdeburg),
Wisconsin-Madison and Zürich for their comments. We thank the staff of the Research Department
of Deutsche Bundesbank for their assistance. Special thanks go to Timm Koerting for excellent research
assistance. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views
of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2011 by Rüdiger Bachmann and Christian Bayer. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not
to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including
© notice, is given to the source.Uncertainty Business Cycles - Really?
Rüdiger Bachmann and Christian Bayer




Are fluctuations in firms’ profitability risk a major cause of regular business cycles? We study this
question within the framework of a heterogeneous-firm dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model
with fixed capital adjustment costs. In such a model, surprise increases of risk lead to a wait-and-see
policy for investment at the firm level and a decrease in aggregate economic activity. We calibrate
the model using German firm-level data with a broader sectoral, size and ownership coverage than
comparable U.S. data sets. The use of these data enables us to provide robust lower and upper bound
estimates for the size of firm-level risk fluctuations. We find that time-varying firm-level risk on its
own is unlikely to be a major quantitative source of regular business cycle fluctuations. When we augment
a model with only aggregate productivity shocks by time-varying risk, the risk shocks dampen the
high contemporaneous correlations of the productivity-shock-only model, but do not alter the other















Is time-varying ﬁrm-level proﬁtability risk a major cause of regular business cycle ﬂuctuations?
Shocks to ﬁrm risk have the appealing theoretical property that they can generate naturally
bust-boom cycles, as shown in a seminal paper by Bloom (2009). After a surprise increase in
risk, ﬁrms, more uncertain about future proﬁtability, will halt or slow down all activities that
cannot be easily reversed, they wait and see. Investment in equipment and structures is an
important example. After the heightened uncertainty is resolved, pent-up demand for capital
goods leads to an investment boom. In this paper we evaluate this mechanism quantitatively.
We start from a heterogeneous-ﬁrm dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with
persistent idiosyncratic productivity shocks and ﬁxed capital adjustment costs. In such an en-
vironment, time-varying ﬁrm-level risk is naturally modeled as ﬂuctuations in the variance of
future ﬁrm-level productivity shocks. We develop the numerical tools to solve such a model in
general equilibrium. The model features ‘wait-and-see’ when ﬁrm-level risk rises, because in-
vestmentdecisionscannotbereversedeasily. Theconditional effectofincreasesinﬁrms’riskis
thus a bust-boom cycle in aggregate economic activity. While important, conditional moments
paint an incomplete picture of the business cycle. We study the unconditional business cycle
implications of time-varying ﬁrm-level risk and compare them to the data and the business
cycle properties of a model with aggregate productivity shocks only.
We use the Deutsche Bundesbank balance sheet data base of German ﬁrms, USTAN, to cal-
ibrate the model – in particular the capital adjustment costs and the idiosyncratic risk pro-
cess. USTAN is a private sector, annual, ﬁrm-level data set that allows us to use 26 years of data
(1973-1998), with cross-sections that have, on average, over 30,000 ﬁrms per year. USTAN has
a broader ownership, size and industry coverage than the available comparable U.S. data sets
from Compustat and the Annual Survey of Manufacturers. The richness of USTAN lets us take
into account measurement error and sample selection issues. It also allows us to formulate
lower and upper bound scenarios for the size of ﬁrm-level risk ﬂuctuations.
We ﬁnd that risk shocks alone do not produce recognizable business cycles. They generate
only 15 per cent of the volatility of aggregate output, with investment and employment being
too volatile relative to output. They lead to negative correlations between aggregate consump-
tion on the one hand and output, investment and employment on the other. We then introduce
risk shocks as an independent process alongside standard aggregate productivity shocks. In
such an environment, risk shocks help to dampen the notoriously too high contemporaneous
correlations in the productivity-shocks-only model. Otherwise the business cycle properties
are unaltered. Moreover, the conditional impulse responses to surprise increases in ﬁrm-level
risk are inconsistent with at least the point estimates of their data counterparts. This can be
amended by allowing for correlation between aggregate productivity and ﬁrm-level risk and
2then feeding their joint dynamics into the model. In this case, ﬁrm-level risk shocks contribute
substantially to aggregate ﬂuctuations. Yet, when we isolate the contribution of the ‘wait-and-
see’ effect to these ﬂuctuations, we ﬁnd that it is again small.
We also show that including time-varying aggregate risk has negligible effects since the av-
erage level of idiosyncratic risk is estimated to be an order of magnitude larger than aggregate
risk. Relative to the large average idiosyncratic risk that ﬁrms face, even the sizeable ﬂuctua-
tions of aggregate risk in the data, with a percentage volatility between 30 and 40 per cent, have
anegligibleimpactonthetotalriskinﬁrms’futureproﬁtabilityandhencealsonegligibleeffects
on ﬁrms’ optimal policies.
Thereisnowagrowingliteraturearguingthatvariousmeasuresofﬁrm-levelriskbothacross
countries and across data sources, e.g. balance sheet and survey data, are unconditionally
countercyclical.1 While interesting and pervasive, these facts do not, however, directly speak
to the question whether risk ﬂuctuations generate regular business cycle ﬂuctuations. Some
authors have tackled this question using structural VARs and (linearized) DSGE models. In
Christiano et al. (2009), a DSGE estimation exercise, risk shocks have a low frequency and a
rather small business cycle impact. This is similar to the SVAR ﬁndings in Bachmann, Elstner
and Sims (2010), who use business survey data to measure ﬁrms’ risk. They also argue that
observed risk increases might be systematic reactions to ﬁrst-moment shocks, rather than au-
tonomous drivers of the business cycle.
Our approach, by contrast, is to quantitatively evaluate the ‘wait-and-see’ effect caused by
capital adjustment frictions. We thus build on the literature that highlights physical frictions as
a propagation mechanism for risk shocks: Bernanke (1983), Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Hassler
(1996 and 2001), Bloom (2009), Bloom et al. (2010) and Schaal (2010). Bloom (2009) structurally
estimatesarichheterogeneousﬁrmmodelthatfeaturesthe‘wait-and-see’effectinpartialequi-
librium. Bloom et al. (2010) show that this conditional effect survives general equilibrium price
movements. Schaal (2010) uses a directed search model with uncertainty shocks to understand
the labor market in the so-called Great Recession.2
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the model. Section 3
describes its calibration and Sections 4 and 5 discuss the results. Appendices provide details on
the data as well as the robustness of the calibration and the simulation results.
1Bachmann and Bayer (2011), Bachmann, Elstner and Sims (2010), Berger and Vavra (2010), Bloom et al. (2010),
Doepke et al. (2005), Doepke and Weber (2006), Gilchrist, Yankow and Zakrajsek (2009), Gourio (2008), Higson et
al. (2002, 2004) and Kehrig (2010).
2The literature has considered other channels, for example ﬁnancial frictions in Arellano et al. (2010), Chugh
(2009) and Gilchrist, Sim and Zakrajsek (2009); or agency problems in Narita (2010). Fernandez-Villaverde et al.
(2009) argue that positive shocks to the interest rate volatility depress economic activity in several Latin American
economies. Another literature stresses the importance of rare, but drastic changes in the economic environment,
disaster risk: Barro (2007), Barro et al. (2010), Gourio (2010). There is also a literature that studies low frequency
movements in both idiosyncratic and aggregate risk, see Davis et al. (2006) as well as Carvalho and Gabaix (2010).
32 The Model
Our model follows closely Khan and Thomas (2008) as well as Bachmann, Caballero and Engel
(2010). The main departure from either paper is the introduction of time-varying idiosyncratic
and aggregate productivity risk. Speciﬁcally, we assume that ﬁrms today observe the standard
deviations of aggregate and idiosyncratic productivity shocks tomorrow, respectively, ¾(z0) and
¾(²0). Notice the timing assumption: if ﬁrms learn their productivity levels at the beginning of
a period, an increase in today’s standard deviation of idiosyncratic shocks does not constitute
higher risk for ﬁrms. It merely leads to a higher cross-sectional dispersion of idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity today. In contrast, higher standard deviations tomorrow are true risk today. We make
this stark timing assumption to give risk shocks the best chance to have the most direct effect
possible. None of our main results depend on it.3
2.1 Firms
The economy consists of a unit mass of small ﬁrms. There is one commodity in the economy
that can be consumed or invested. Each ﬁrm produces this commodity, employing its pre-
determinedcapitalstock(k)andlabor(n),accordingtothefollowingCobb-Douglasdecreasing-
returns-to-scale production function (µ È0, ºÈ0, µÅºÇ1):
y Æ z²kµnº, (1)
where z and ² denote aggregate and idiosyncratic revenue productivity, respectively.
The idiosyncratic log productivity process is ﬁrst-order Markov with autocorrelation ½² and
time-varying conditional standard deviation, ¾(²0). Idiosyncratic productivity shocks are oth-
erwise independent from aggregate shocks. The aggregate log productivity process is an AR(1)
with autocorrelation ½z and time-varying conditional standard deviation, ¾(z0). Idiosyncratic
productivity shocks are independent across productive units. The processes for ¾(²0)¡ ¯ ¾(²) and
¾(z0)¡ ¯ ¾(z) are also modeled as AR(1) processes, where ¯ ¾(²) denotes the time-average of id-
iosyncratic risk and ¯ ¾(z) the same for aggregate risk.
We denote the trend growth rate of aggregate productivity by (1¡µ)(°¡1), so that aggregate
output and capital grow at rate °¡1 along the balanced growth path. From now on we work
with k and y (and later aggregate consumption,C) in efﬁciency units.
3In Table 10 in Appendix B we explore a timing assumption, where ﬁrms today know only today’s standard
deviations, but predict tomorrow’s using persistence in the process for the standard deviation of idiosyncratic
productivity shocks.
4Each period a ﬁrm draws its current cost of capital adjustment, » · » · ¯ », which is denom-
inated in units of labor, from a time-invariant distribution, G. G is a uniform distribution on
[», ¯ »], common to all ﬁrms. Draws are independent across ﬁrms and over time, and employ-
ment is freely adjustable.
Upon investment, i, the ﬁrm incurs a ﬁxed cost of !», where ! is the current real wage.
Capital depreciates at a rate ±. We can then summarize the evolution of the ﬁrm’s capital stock
(in efﬁciency units) between two consecutive periods, from k to k0, as follows:
Fixed cost paid °k0
i 6Æ0: !» (1¡±)k Åi
i Æ0: 0 (1¡±)k
Given the i.i.d. nature of the adjustment costs, it is sufﬁcient to describe differences across





constitutes the current aggregate state and ¹ evolves according to the




, which ﬁrms take as given.
To summarize: at the beginning of a period, a ﬁrm is characterized by its pre-determined
capital stock, its idiosyncratic productivity, and its capital adjustment cost. Given the aggregate
state, it decides its employment level, n, production and depreciation occurs, workers are paid,
and investment decisions are made. Then the period ends.
Next we describe the dynamic programming problem of a ﬁrm. We will take two shortcuts
(details can be found in Khan and Thomas, 2008). We state the problem in terms of utils of
the representative household (rather than physical units), and denote the marginal utility of




. Also, given the i.i.d. nature of the adjustment costs,




denote the expected discounted value - in utils - of a ﬁrm that
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and does not adjust, and Vadj the continuation value, net of adjustment costs AC, if the ﬁrm





































where both expectation operators average over next period’s realizations of the aggregate and
idiosyncratic shocks, conditional on this period’s values, and we recall that i Æ °k0 ¡(1¡±)k.
The discount factor, ¯, reﬂects the time preferences of the representative household.













, the ﬁrm chooses optimally labor demand, whether to adjust its capital
stock at the end of the period, and the optimal capital stock, conditional on adjustment. This









capital is pre-determined, the optimal employment decision is independent of the current ad-
justment cost draw.
2.2 Households
We assume a continuum of identical households that have access to a complete set of state-
contingent claims. Hence, there is no heterogeneity across households. They own shares in
the ﬁrms and are paid dividends. We do not need to model the household side in detail (see
Khan and Thomas (2008) for that), we just use the ﬁrst-order conditions that determine the
equilibrium wage and the marginal utility of consumption.
Households have a standard felicity function in consumption and labor:4
U(C,Nh)ÆlogC ¡ ANh, (5)
whereC denotesconsumptionand Nh thehousehold’slaborsupply. Householdsmaximizethe











4We have experimented with a CRRA of 3 without much impact on our results.























1. Firm optimality: Taking !, p and ¡ as given, V 1¡
²,k;z,¾(z0),¾(²0),¹
¢
solves (3) and the









2. Household optimality: Taking ! and p as given, the household’s consumption and labor
supply satisfy (6) and (7).








































where J(x)Æ0, if x Æ0 and 1, otherwise.
5. Modelconsistentdynamics: Theevolutionofthecross-sectionthatcharacterizestheecon-









processes for z, ¾(²0) as well as ².
Conditions1, 2, 3and4deﬁneanequilibriumgiven¡, whilestep5speciﬁestheequilibrium
condition for ¡.
72.4 Solution
It is well-known that (3) is not computable, because ¹ is inﬁnite dimensional. We follow Krusell
and Smith (1997, 1998) and approximate the distribution, ¹, by a ﬁnite set of its moments, and
its evolution, ¡, by a simple log-linear rule. As usual, we include aggregate capital holdings, ¯ k.
We also ﬁnd that it improves the ﬁt of the Krusell-Smith-rules to add the standard deviation of
the natural logarithm of idiosyncratic productivity, std(log(²)). This is of course owing to the
now time-varying nature of the distribution of idiosyncratic productivity. In the same vein, we
approximate the equilibrium pricing function by a log-linear rule, discrete aggregate state by
discrete aggregate state:



























forms (8a)–(8b) and check that in equilibrium they yield a good ﬁt to the actual law of motion.
The R2 for capital in our baseline calibration are all above 0.999. For the marginal utility of
consumption they exceed 0.995.5
Substituting ¯ k and std(log(²)) for ¹ into (3) and using (8a)–(8b), (3) becomes a computable










this problem by value function iteration on V 0. We do so by applying multivariate spline tech-
niques that allow for a continuous choice of capital when the ﬁrm adjusts.
With these policy functions, we can then simulate a model economy without imposing the
equilibrium pricing rule (8b). Rather, we impose market-clearing conditions and solve for the
pricing kernel at every point in time of the simulation. We simulate the model economy for
a large number of time periods. This generates a time series of {pt} and {¯ kt} endogenously, on
whichtheassumedrules(8a)–(8b)canbeupdatedwithasimpleOLSregression. Theprocedure









to the previous ones.
5Of course, std(log(²)) has an analytically known law of motion, given the AR(1) speciﬁcation for ¾(²0). The
lowest R2 for the capital rule without std(log(²)) is just above 0.94 and for the marginal utility of consumption just
above 0.99.
83 Calibration
In this Section we discuss the calibration of those model parameters that remain the same
across all speciﬁcations and for the baseline model speciﬁcation presented in Section 4. Our
ﬁrm-level data source is the USTAN database from Deutsche Bundesbank. USTAN is a large an-
nual ﬁrm-level balance sheet data base (Unternehmensbilanzstatistik). It has broader coverage
in terms of ﬁrm size, industry and ownership structure than comparable U.S. data sets.6 From
USTAN we compute a time series of the cross-sectional dispersion of ﬁrm-level Solow residual
growth for 26 years, spanning 1973-1998.
Standard Parameters
The model period is a year. This corresponds to the data frequency in USTAN. Most ﬁrm-
level data sets that are based on balance sheet data are of that frequency. The following pa-
rameters then have standard values: ¯ Æ 0.98 and ± Æ 0.094, which we compute from German
national accounting data (VGR) for the nonﬁnancial private business sector. Given this depre-
ciation rate, we pick °Æ1.014, in order to match the time-average aggregate investment rate in
the nonﬁnancial private business sector: 0.108. ° Æ 1.014 is also consistent with German long-
run growth rates. The disutility of work parameter, A, is chosen to generate an average time
spent at work of 0.33: A Æ2. We set the output elasticities of labor and capital to ºÆ0.5565 and
µ Æ0.2075, respectively, which correspond to the measured median labor and capital shares in
manufacturing in the USTAN data base.7
Wemeasurethesteadystatestandarddeviationofidiosyncraticproductivityshocksas ¯ ¾(²)Æ
0.0905. In the calculation of this number we take measurement error and 2-digit industry-year
effects as well as ﬁrm-level ﬁxed effects in Solow residual growth rates into account.8 Since
idiosyncratic productivity shocks in the data also exhibit above-Gaussian kurtosis - 4.4480 on
6Davis et al. (2006) show that studying only publicly traded ﬁrms (Compustat) can lead to wrong conclusions,
when cross-sectional dispersion is concerned. Also, just under half of our ﬁrms are from manufacturing. We
focus instead on the nonﬁnancial private business sector. Speciﬁcally, we include ﬁrms that are in one of the
followingsix1-digitindustries: agriculture,miningandenergy,manufacturing,construction,trade,transportation
and communication. For details on the data set and the calculation of ¾(²) in the data, see Appendix A as well as
Bachmann and Bayer (2011). An additional advantage of these data is easy access: while on-site, it is otherwise
practically unrestricted for researchers, so that results derived from this data base can be easily checked.
7If one views the DRTS assumption as a mere stand-in for a CRTS production function with monopolistic com-
petition, than these choices would correspond to an employment elasticity of the underlying production function
of 0.7284 and a markup of 1
µÅº Æ 1.31. The implied capital elasticity of the revenue function, µ
1¡º is 0.47. Cooper
and Haltiwanger (2006), using LRD manufacturing data, estimate this parameter to be 0.592; Henessy and Whited
(2005), usingCompustatdata, ﬁnd0.551. Wehaveexperimentedwithbothelasticitieswithinconventional ranges,
but have not found any of our main results to depend on them. Simulation results are available on request.
8See Appendix A for details. Removing ﬁxed effects here serves two purposes. First, it removes differences
in idiosyncratic productivity growth that are predictable for the ﬁrm. Second, it homogenizes the sample in the
sense that we can read these numbers as if the sample composition was ﬁxed. Appendix A also deals with sample
selection issues.
9average -, and since the ﬁxed adjustment costs parameters will be identiﬁed by the kurtosis of
the ﬁrm-level investment rate (together with its skewness), we want to avoid attributing excess
kurtosis in the ﬁrm-level investment rate to lumpy investment, when the idiosyncratic driving
forceitselfhasexcesskurtosis. Weincorporatethemeasuredexcesskurtosisintothediscretiza-
tionprocessfortheidiosyncraticproductivitystatebyusingamixtureoftwoGaussiandistribu-
tions: N(0,0.0586) and N(0,0.1224) - the standard deviations are 0.0905§0.0319, with a weight
of 0.4118 on the ﬁrst distribution. Finally, we set ½² Æ 0.95. This process is discretized on a
19¡state-grid, using Tauchen’s (1986) procedure with mixed Gaussian normals. Heteroskedas-
ticityintheidiosyncraticproductivityprocessismodeledwithtime-varyingtransitionmatrices
between idiosyncratic productivity states, where the matrices correspond to different values of
¾(²0).
In what follows, we describe our baseline choices for the parameters that characterize the
aggregate shock processes and adjustment costs. In Section 5 as well as Appendix B we discuss
how our model behaves under various alternative choices for these parameters.
Aggregate Shocks
In the baseline case we abstract from time-varying aggregate risk and correlation between
aggregate productivity and idiosyncratic risk. Both themes will be taken up in Section 5. Thus,
tocompute½z and ¯ ¾(z),weestimateanAR(1)-processforthelinearlydetrendedcross-sectional
average of the natural logarithm of ﬁrm-level Solow residuals, again taking industry as well as
ﬁrm-level ﬁxed effects in Solow residuals into account. The estimation of the AR(1)-process
leads to ½z Æ 0.7530 and ¯ ¾(z) Æ 0.0133.9 This process is discretized on a 5¡state grid, using
Tauchen’s (1986) procedure.
We also estimate an AR(1)-process for the linearly detrended cross-sectional standard de-
viation of the ﬁrst differences of the natural logarithm of ﬁrm-level Solow residuals. This leads
to ½¾(²) Æ0.5800 and ¾¾(²) Æ0.0037.10 Again, this process is discretized on a 5¡state grid, using
Tauchen’s (1986) procedure. This ﬁner discretization compared to a two-state one has the ad-
vantage that we do not need to deﬁne the high-risk state as a certain multiple of the size of the
low-risk state, in order to match the overall volatility of ﬁrm-level risk. We do not want to take
a stand on how ‘catastrophic’, i.e. strong but rare, a risk shock is. Instead, we opt for assuming
normalityofriskshocks, whichissupportedbythedata. BothaShapiro-Wilk-testandaJarque-
Bera-test do not reject at conventional levels. In fact, Bloom et al. (2010) show that catastrophic
risk events such as a doubling of ﬁrm-level risk has not occurred in U.S. post war data, and we
do not ﬁnd it in German data, either.11
9Without taking out the ﬁxed effects in the cross-section these numbers would be, respectively, ½z Æ 0.7209
and ¯ ¾(z) Æ 0.0147. In Table 11 in Appendix B we report results, where we use an AR(1) based on aggregate Solow
residuals calculated from national accounting data. They are basically the same as our baseline results.
10Without the ﬁxed effects these numbers would be, respectively, ½¾(²) Æ0.5710 and ¾¾(²) Æ0.0037.
11Figure 5 in Appendix A.2 shows the time path of ﬁrm-level risk and average productivity.
10To gauge the importance of shocks to ﬁrm-level risk for aggregate ﬂuctuations we use its
time series coefﬁcient of variation, which for our baseline case equals: CVrisk Æ4.72%. We will
show below that the business cycle relevance of ﬁrm-level risk shocks is essentially an increas-
ing function of this statistic.
Pinning down the value ofCVrisk from ﬁrm-level data is invariably laden with assumptions
and decisions during the data treatment process. We view our baseline number for CVrisk as a
middle case. In order to assess how our results depend on CVrisk, we consider two additional
scenarios: a ‘Lower Bound’ scenario, where we halve CVrisk, and an ‘Upper Bound’ scenario,
where CVrisk is quadrupled. The ‘Lower Bound’ scenario corresponds roughly to a case where
we do not eliminate ﬁxed effects nor measurement error and focus only on the smallest 25 per-
cent of ﬁrms (CVrisk Æ 1.97%). The idea behind this scenario is to stay as close as possible to
the raw data, using minimal assumptions, and to compensate, albeit somewhat crudely, for the




line CVrisk to 8.38%. To be conservative, we double this again and use four times the baseline
CVrisk as the ‘Upper Bound’ scenario. We show in Section 5.3 that these bounds also cover the
available U.S. numbers.
Adjustment Costs
In our baseline speciﬁcation, we set the lower bound of the adjustment cost distribution, »,
tozero. Giventheaforementionedsetofparameters
³
¯,±,°,A,º,µ, ¯ ¾(²),½², ¯ ¾(z),½z,¾¾(²),½¾(²)
´
,
we calibrate the remaining adjustment costs parameter, ¯ », to minimize a quadratic form in
the normalized differences between the time-average ﬁrm-level investment rate skewness pro-






























positive skewness – 2.1920 – as well as excess kurtosis – 20.0355. Caballero et al. (1995) doc-
12The normalization constants in (9) are, respectively, the time series standard deviation of the cross-sectional
investment rate skewness and the time series standard deviation of the cross-sectional investment rate kurtosis in
the data.
11ument a similar fact for U.S. manufacturing plants. They also argue that non-convex capital
adjustment costs are an important ingredient to explain such a strongly non-Gaussian distri-
bution, given a close-to-Gaussian ﬁrm-level shock process. With ﬁxed adjustment costs, ﬁrms
haveanincentivetolumptheirinvestmentactivitytogetherovertimeinordertoeconomizeon
these adjustment costs. Therefore, typical capital adjustments are large, which creates excess
kurtosis. Making use of depreciation, ﬁrms can adjust their capital stock downward without
paying adjustment costs. This makes negative investments less likely and hence leads to pos-
itive skewness in ﬁrm-level investment rates. We therefore use the skewness and kurtosis of
ﬁrm-level investment rates to identify ¯ ».
The following Table 1 shows that ¯ » is indeed identiﬁed in this calibration strategy, as cross-
sectional skewness and kurtosis of the ﬁrm-level investment rates are both monotonically in-
creasingin ¯ ». Theminimumofªisachievedfor ¯ »Æ0.25, whichconstitutesourbaselinecase.13
This implies average costs conditional on adjustment equivalent to roughly 7% of annual ﬁrm-
level value added, which is well in line with estimates from the U.S. (see Bloom (2009), Table IV,
for an overview).
Table 1: CALIBRATION OF ADJUSTMENT COSTS - ¯ »
¯ » Skewness Kurtosis ª(¯ ») Adj. costs/
Unit of Output
0 -0.0100 3.5696 18.9640 0%
0.01 0.8961 5.1365 10.7922 0.74%
0.1 2.2612 9.6531 3.5651 3.53%
0.25 (BL) 2.8847 12.3966 2.9162 6.97%
0.5 3.3398 14.75196 3.6431 12.09%
0.75 3.5958 16.2382 4.5482 16.97%
1 3.7735 17.3476 5.4069 21.90%
5 4.7616 24.8953 14.4252 110.31%
Notes: ‘BL’ denotes the baseline calibration. Skewness and kurtosis refer to the time-average of the corresponding
cross-sectional moments of ﬁrm-level investment rates. The fourth column displays the value of ª in (9). The last
column shows the average adjustment costs conditional on adjustment as a fraction of the ﬁrm’s annual output.
13Table12inAppendixBshowsresultswherewequadrupletheadjustmentcosts, ¯ »Æ1. Thisistogiveﬁrmsmore
of a wait-and-see motive. Table 13 in Appendix B shows results for the case » Æ ¯ ». Our baseline speciﬁcation has
stochastic adjustment costs, but their uncertainty does not change over time. This may reduce the time-varying
‘wait-and-see’ effect. We check this, by making adjustment costs deterministic in this alternative speciﬁcation.
124 Baseline Results
With this set-up we can now answer our initial question concerning the importance of risk
shocks as drivers of the business cycles. We do so in two steps. First, we study a model with
only risk shocks (‘Risk Model’). Then we add risk shocks as an independent process alongside
standard aggregate productivity shocks (‘Full Model’).
4.1 Risk Model
Partial equilibrium models feature ‘wait-and-see’ dynamics as their conditional response to a
risk shock: a collapse of economic activity on impact, then a strong rebound and overshooting
(Bloom,2009). WeconﬁrminFigure1thatthischaracteristicimpulseresponsesurvivesgeneral
equilibrium real interest rate and wage adjustments. In fact, the initial investment collapse is
somewhat stronger in general equilibrium due to the usual wealth effect. Households perceive
the prolonged rebound and overshooting of economic activity in the future, are wealthier and
increaseconsumptionofgoodsandleisuretoday. Lessoutputisproduced,moreofitconsumed
and investment decreases. The rebound is weaker in general equilibrium due to consumption
smoothing.
Figure 1: Response of Aggregate Investment to a Shock in Idiosyncratic Risk






















Notes: impulse responses are computed by increasing ¾(²0) by one standard deviation and letting it return to its
steady state value, according to the AR(1) process estimated in Section 3. ‘GE’ stands for general equilibrium and
takes real wage and interest rate movements into account. ‘PE’ stands for partial equilibrium and ﬁxes the real
wage and the interest rate at its steady state level.
Toanswerourinitialquestionandtounderstandtheimportanceoftime-varyingriskforthe
business cycle, however, conditional responses are not sufﬁcient. Table 2 displays the uncondi-
13Table 2: AGGREGATE BUSINESS CYCLE STATISTICS FOR THE ‘RISK MODEL’
Risk Model Risk Model Risk Model Data
Baseline Lower Bound Upper Bound
Volatility
of Output 0.34% 0.17% 1.20% 2.30%
Volatility of aggregate variables relative to output volatility
Consumption 0.79 0.79 0.81 0.78
Investment 7.26 7.26 7.27 1.90
Employment 1.48 1.47 1.51 0.78
Persistence
Output 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.48
Consumption 0.42 0.42 0.40 0.67
Investment 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.42
Employment 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.61
Contemporaneous Correlation with Aggregate Output
Consumption -0.12 -0.12 -0.14 0.66
Investment 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.83
Employment 0.82 0.82 0.81 0.68
Contemporaneous Correlation with Aggregate Consumption
Investment -0.62 -0.61 -0.63 0.60
Employment -0.67 -0.67 -0.69 0.36
Notes: ‘Risk Model-Baseline’ refers to a simulation, where the only aggregate shock is to ¾(²0), whose time series
coefﬁcient of variation is 4.72%. ‘Risk Model-Lower Bound’ halves this coefﬁcient of variation and ‘Risk Model-
Upper Bound’ quadruples it. ‘Data’ refers to the nonﬁnancial private business sector’s aggregates. All series, both
from data and model simulations, have been logged and HP-ﬁltered with smoothing parameter 100.
tional business cycle properties of models that feature the conditional ‘wait-and-see’-response
shown in Figure 1. Risk ﬂuctuations in the ‘Upper Bound’ scenario explain somewhat over half
of the output volatility in the data. In the baseline calibration, however, risk shocks produce
only 15% of the output volatility in the data. Interestingly, output volatility is essentially a linear
function of the size of risk ﬂuctuations. The relative volatilities of investment and employment
are too high. Their persistence is too low. Consumption is negatively correlated with the other
macroeconomic aggregates in this model.
This constitutes a negative result. The literature has argued that risk shocks might generate
cycles through the concentration of economic activity in periods of relatively stable economic
environments. However, our quantitative results show that risk ﬂuctuations do not keep this
14promise when introduced in a relatively standard general equilibrium environment.
We note that going beyond a partial equilibrium analysis and taking into account general
equilibrium price movements is important to understanding the relatively mild ﬂuctuations
from risk shocks. With ﬁxed real interest rates and real wages the output ﬂuctuations in each
scenarioroughlydouble: 0.67%,0.34%and2.42%forthe‘Baseline’-,‘LowerBound’-and‘Upper
Bound’-scenarios, respectively.14
Table 2, in its last column, also shows that the business cycle properties in Germany are
roughly the same as in the U.S., so that our results are not due to idiosyncracies in the German
business cycle. The only exception is the (relative) volatility of investment, which is indeed
lower than in the U.S. However, in a very open economy such as Germany it is unclear what the
best data counterpart of model investment is; indeed, the relative volatility of national saving
in Germany is 4.62, much closer to the U.S. number for investment.
Weconcludewithourﬁrstresult: ﬁrm-levelriskﬂuctuationsalone, mediatedthroughcapital
adjustment frictions, are unlikely to be major drivers of the business cycle.
4.2 Full Model
We next ask whether and how exogenous ﬂuctuations in ﬁrm-level risk alter the business cycle
dynamics of a standard RBC model with ﬁxed capital adjustment costs, when they are added as
a second independent aggregate shock process.
Table 3 shows that for an intermediate estimate of the CVrisk the business cycle is essen-
tially identical to the one from the RBC model. The ability of risk ﬂuctuations to proportionally
rescale output ﬂuctuations has vanished, when ﬁrst moment ﬂuctuations are present. Only in
the extreme case of a CVrisk Æ18.88% can risk ﬂuctuations contribute to dampening the noto-
riously too high comovement of aggregate quantities in the one-shock RBC model, albeit not
enough to match the data.
Thisisoursecondresult: ﬁrm-levelriskﬂuctuationsaddedtoﬁrstmomentproductivityshocks
do not alter signiﬁcantly RBC business cycle dynamics, with the exception of comovement in the
case of highly volatile risk.
14Detailed simulation results are available on request.
15Table 3: AGGREGATE BUSINESS CYCLE STATISTICS FOR THE ‘FULL MODEL’
Full Model Full Model Full Model RBC Model Data
Baseline Lower Bound Upper Bound
Volatility
of Output 2.26% 2.26% 2.39% 2.26% 2.30%
Volatility of aggregate variables relative to output volatility
Consumption 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.78
Investment 3.74 3.71 4.14 3.70 1.90
Employment 0.60 0.59 0.71 0.59 0.78
Persistence
Output 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.48
Consumption 0.59 0.59 0.56 0.59 0.67
Investment 0.34 0.34 0.31 0.35 0.42
Employment 0.33 0.34 0.28 0.35 0.61
Contemporaneous Correlation with Aggregate Output
Consumption 0.91 0.92 0.79 0.92 0.66
Investment 0.96 0.97 0.93 0.97 0.83
Employment 0.93 0.94 0.87 0.94 0.68
Contemporaneous Correlation with Aggregate Consumption
Investment 0.77 0.79 0.51 0.80 0.60
Employment 0.70 0.74 0.38 0.75 0.36
Notes: see notes to Table 2. ‘Full Model’ refers to a simulation, where there are two orthogonal aggregate shocks,
to z and ¾(²0). The ﬂuctuations of z in ‘Full Model-Baseline’ have been rescaled to roughly match the volatility of
output. Allothermodelsusethesamerescalingfactor. ‘RBCModel’referstoasimulation,wheretheonlyaggregate
shock is to z.
5 Extensions and Robustness
5.1 A Model With Time-Varying Aggregate Risk
In this section, we add time-varying aggregate risk to the ‘Full Model’ with time-varying ﬁrm-
level risk and productivity shocks. Formally, we allow ¾(z0) to deviate from ¯ ¾(z). For computa-
tional simplicity, to save on one state variable, we introduce this additional shock as perfectly
correlated with the state of ﬁrm-level risk. We expect to maximize the impact of time-varying
aggregate risk this way. The impact of time-varying risk – wait-and-see – can only be diluted,
when both types of risk can move in opposite directions. Thus, in the implementation, when-
16ever ¾(²0) moves around on its 5-state grid, centered around ¯ ¾(²)Æ0.0905, we have ¾(z0) move
around in the same way on a 5-state grid, centered around ¯ ¾(z)Æ0.0133. We use the grid width
ofthelattertocalibratethetimeseriescoefﬁcientofvariationofaggregaterisktoroughly35%.15




idiosyncratic risk only, which are similar to those from the ‘RBC Model’.
Table 4: AGGREGATE BUSINESS CYCLE STATISTICS FOR THE ‘FULL MODEL’ WITH TIME-VARYING
AGGREGATE RISK
Full Model Full Model RBC Model Data
AGGR-RISK Baseline
Volatility
of Output 2.35% 2.26% 2.26% 2.30%
Volatility of aggregate variables relative to output volatility
Consumption 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.78
Investment 3.73 3.74 3.70 1.90
Employment 0.59 0.60 0.59 0.78
Persistence
Output 0.43 0.41 0.42 0.48
Consumption 0.60 0.59 0.60 0.67
Investment 0.36 0.34 0.35 0.42
Employment 0.34 0.33 0.35 0.61
Contemporaneous Correlation with Aggregate Output
Consumption 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.66
Investment 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.83
Employment 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.68
Contemporaneous Correlation with Aggregate Consumption
Investment 0.77 0.77 0.80 0.60
Employment 0.70 0.70 0.75 0.36
Notes: see notes to Tables 2 and 3. ‘Full Model-AGGR-RISK’ refers to a variant of the ‘Full Model’, where also ¾(z0)
varies over time. It is perfectly correlated with ¾(²0) and its time series coefﬁcient of variation is 34.72%.
15We use rolling window standard deviation estimates for the growth rates of aggregate output and employment
in Germany and the U.S. The precise number is somewhat sensitive to the data frequency and window size used -
higher frequencies and larger window sizes tend to give lower coefﬁcients of variation for aggregate volatility. But
most results lie between 30 and 40 per cent.
17To understand this result note that the average idiosyncratic risk, ¯ ¾(²), is almost an order
of magnitude larger than the average aggregate risk, ¯ ¾(z). Since standard deviations are not
additive, the combined small aggregate and large idiosyncratic conditional risk, i.e. the stan-
dard deviation of the combined productivity shock, is close to the one of idiosyncratic risk. For
example, starting from a situation of average aggregate and idiosyncratic risk, the combined
conditional risk the ﬁrm faces is 0.0915. Jumping from here to a situation with highest aggre-
gate risk (and average idiosyncratic risk) would lead to a combined conditional risk of 0.0940, a
2.7% increase. Moving from the average situation to a situation with highest idiosyncratic risk
(and average aggregate risk), leads to an increase in the combined risk to 0.1049 or almost 15%.
We conclude with our third result: aggregate risk ﬂuctuations added to ﬁrst moment pro-
ductivity shocks and idiosyncratic risk ﬂuctuations do not alter signiﬁcantly RBC business cycle
dynamics.
5.2 A Model with Correlated Risk and Productivity Shocks
In the previous sections we have investigated the unconditional business cycle properties of
models with risk shocks. In this Section we study the conditional responses of the model and
the data to an innovation in ﬁrm-level risk.
We estimate three-variable VARs with the cross-sectional average of the natural logarithm
of ﬁrm-level Solow residuals, idiosyncratic risk and various aggregate activity variables. This
ordering is then used in a simple Choleski-“identiﬁcation”, which is, obviously, not meant to
have a structural interpretation. It is rather a different, but convenient and instructive way to
summarize the data, albeit, given the annual frequency of the data and thus relatively few data
points, invariably with some imprecision.
Figure 2 shows this exercise for aggregate output and total hours (using aggregate employ-
ment leads to essentially the same picture). Figure 3 does the same for aggregate investment
and consumption. The responses in the data of output, hours, investment and consumption to
ariskinnovationarepositive,positive,positiveandnegative,respectively. Themodelresponses
forthe‘FullModel-BL’,i.e. independentﬁrstandsecondmomentshocks,arejusttheopposite;
they feature wait-and-see dynamics. Moreover, the risk responses of the ‘Full Model - BL’ are
not nearly as pronounced as in the data and have overall the wrong shape.
The impulse responses estimated on simulated model data are much closer to those in the
data, however, when we allow for correlated risk and productivity processes and feed into the
model the joint dynamics we estimate from the data for these two time series (‘CORR-BL’). The
impulse responses from simulated data now qualitatively match the shape of the impulse re-
sponses from actual data for all four macroeconomic quantities.
18Figure 2: Impulse Responses to an Innovation in Idiosyncratic Risk - Data and Models
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Notes: impulse response functions from SVARs with the linearly detrended cross-sectional average of the natural
logarithm of ﬁrm-level Solow residuals (ordered ﬁrst), the linearly detrended idiosyncratic risk (ordered second)
and HP(100)-ﬁltered aggregate output/total hours (ordered third). The dotted lines reﬂect one standard deviation
conﬁdenceboundsfortheestimatesonthedatafrom10,000bootstrapreplications. Weemployabiascorrectiona
la Kilian (1998). Estimates from data are in red, estimates from simulated model data in blue (‘Full Model-BL’) and
green (‘CORR-BL’), respectively. ‘CORR-BL’ refers to a simulation, where there are two correlated aggregate shocks,
to z and ¾(²0). ‘CORR-BL’ is based on a time series coefﬁcient of variation for ¾(²0) of 4.72%. The joint process is
given by: (0.8749 ¡1.4708
0.1382 0.5101 ), for the VAR-coefﬁcients, where the ﬁrst row is for the z-equation, and (0.0088 0.2010
0.2010 0.0029) for the
matrix of standard deviations and the correlation coefﬁcient. The joint process for z and ¾(²0) is discretized by a
two-dimensional analog of Tauchen’s (1986) procedure.
19Figure 3: Impulse Responses to an Innovation in Idiosyncratic Risk - Data and Models
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Notes: see notes to Figure 2.
Unlike in the ‘Full Model’, the introduction of risk shocks in ‘CORR-BL’ also changes the
stochastic properties of aggregate productivity. This effect is very strong, as can be seen in Fig-
ure 4, where we compute the impulse response of a risk shock on aggregate investment in a
model, where actual ﬁrm-level risk is ﬁxed at ¯ ¾(²) and ¾(²) is re-interpreted as a latent state
variable, which jointly evolves with z just as in ‘CORR-BL’. This speciﬁcation is denoted ‘Fore-
cast Model’, because “risk” today merely predicts productivity tomorrow, but does not change
the idiosyncratic stochastic environment of the ﬁrms. In other words, “risk” is just a signal of
future productivity in this speciﬁcation. The impulse responses for ‘CORR-BL’ and ‘Forecast
Model’ are almost identical, which suggests that the conditional effects of risk on aggregate ac-
tivity are mainly driven by this signalling effect.
This signalling effect – the coefﬁcient of risk today on productivity tomorrow is negative
(¡1.4708)–hasimportantgeneralequilibriumimplications. Figure4showsthatwithoutmarket-
clearingrealinterestratesandwages,theinvestmentresponsetoariskshockwouldbestrongly
negative. Since higher risk today forecasts lower productivity tomorrow, a general equilibrium
wealth effect makes agents consume less and work more (the real wage declines both in the
data and the model), which drives up output and – through a decrease in the real interest rate –
investment on impact.
20Figure 4: Impulse Response of Aggregate Investment to an Innovation in Idiosyncratic Risk















CORR − BL − PE
Notes: see notes to Figure 2. ‘Forecast Model’ uses the same aggregate driving process as ‘CORR-BL’, but sets the
actual value of ¾(²) constant at ¯ ¾(²). ¾(²) is simply a second random variable that is correlated with z. ‘Full Model
- BL - PE’ is ‘Full Model - BL’ with a ﬁxed real interest rate and real wage.
21Table 5: AGGREGATE BUSINESS CYCLE STATISTICS FOR THE MODEL WITH CORRELATED RISK AND
PRODUCTIVITY SHOCKS
CORR CORR CORR Forecast Naive RBC Data
BL LB UB Model Model Model
Volatility
of Output 2.34% 2.52% 1.67% 2.71% 2.42% 1.75% 2.30%
Volatility of aggregate variables relative to output volatility
Consumption 0.42 0.40 0.59 0.39 0.51 0.50 0.78
Investment 3.97 4.12 3.32 4.24 3.67 3.69 1.90
Employment 0.62 0.66 0.53 0.69 0.58 0.58 0.78
Persistence
Output 0.61 0.62 0.47 0.64 0.64 0.42 0.48
Consumption 0.68 0.70 0.56 0.73 0.72 0.59 0.67
Investment 0.58 0.60 0.42 0.61 0.60 0.35 0.42
Employment 0.58 0.59 0.45 0.60 0.60 0.35 0.61
Contemporaneous Correlation with Aggregate Output
Consumption 0.94 0.92 0.93 0.90 0.92 0.92 0.66
Investment 0.98 0.98 0.95 0.98 0.96 0.97 0.83
Employment 0.98 0.97 0.82 0.97 0.94 0.94 0.68
Contemporaneous Correlation with Aggregate Consumption
Investment 0.86 0.83 0.76 0.79 0.78 0.80 0.60
Employment 0.84 0.80 0.55 0.75 0.72 0.75 0.36
Notes: see notes to Tables 2 and 3, as well as Figure 2. ‘CORR-BL’ is based on CVrisk Æ 4.72%. ‘Risk Model-Lower
Bound’ halves this coefﬁcient of variation and ‘Risk Model-Upper Bound’ quadruples it. ‘Naive Model’ is the same
as ‘Forecast Model’, except that agents do not take into account that there is a second random variable that shocks
the economy. The ﬂuctuations of z in ‘CORR-BL’ have been rescaled to roughly match the volatility of output. All
the models use the same rescaling factor.
Table 5 summarizes and compares the unconditional business cycle moments for the ‘RBC
Model’ and ‘CORR-BL’. It does so in several steps, as the introduction of a second correlated
shock changes several features at once relative to the one-shock ‘RBC Model’. The intermedi-
ate steps help identify these different effects. The ‘Naive Model’ uses the jointly estimated data
generating process for risk and productivity in the model simulations, under two assumptions:
ﬁrst, the agents in the economy – naively – continue to use the univariate process for produc-
tivity from the ‘RBC Model’ when they compute their optimal policies; and, secondly, ¾(²) is
constant at ¯ ¾(²). The ‘Forecast Model’ lifts the ﬁrst assumption, while keeping the second. It
corresponds to a model where productivity is driven by two latent random processes instead
22of one, and agents know that. In addition, ‘CORR-BL’ lifts the second assumption. ‘CORR - LB’
and ‘CORR - UB’ halve and quadruple, respectively, the time series coefﬁcient of variation of
ﬁrm-level risk. The changes from the ‘Forecast Model’ to ‘CORR-BL’ identify the speciﬁc effects
of time-varying ﬁrm risk on aggregate ﬂuctuations.
It is mostly volatilities and relative volatilities that are changed by introducing the second
shock. Output ﬂuctuates more, but these output ﬂuctuations are dampened, when actual risk
shocks hit the economy, the more so the more volatile risk is. The responsiveness of the econ-
omy to productivity shocks decreases in the overall volatility of risk shocks. In terms of relative
volatilities, the more volatile actual risk, the less ﬂuctuates aggregate investment and the more
aggregate consumption. The correlation structure of aggregate quantities is the same across
models, and the increase in persistence from the ‘RBC Model’ to a model with risk shocks is
largely mechanical, as it is manifest already in the ‘Naive Model’.
Wesummarizethissectionwithourfourthresult: theconditionalimpulseresponsesofaggre-
gate quantities to a risk innovation in a model where risk and productivity shocks are uncorre-
latedareinconsistentwiththeirdatacounterparts. Amodelwithcorrelatedriskandproductivity
shocksmatchesthedatabetterintermsofconditionalimpulseresponsesandleadstoareduction
of the ability of productivity shocks to generate aggregate ﬂuctuations.
5.3 Discussion
Are the ﬁrm-level risk processes in Germany and the U.S. comparable?16
Table 6: COMPARISON GERMANY - U.S.
CVrisk Cyclicalityrisk
STD IQR STD IQR
Baseline Calibration 4.72% -0.47
Manufacturing USTAN 6.08% -0.61
Manufacturing USTAN Output-based 5.01% 8.00% -0.54 -0.50
Manufacturing ASM Ouptut-based 9.80% -0.36
Notes: CVrisk is the time series coefﬁcient of variation for the corresponding ﬁrm-level risk measure, which can
be a cross-sectional standard deviation (‘STD’) or the interquartile range (‘IQR’). Cyclicalityrisk is the correla-
tion coefﬁcient of the corresponding ﬁrm-level risk measure with HP(100)-ﬁltered GDP . ‘Manufacturing USTAN’
is similar to ‘Baseline Calibration’ in that it take ﬁxed effects and measurement error into account, as described in
Appendix A, but restricts the sample to manufacturing. ‘Manufacturing USTAN Output-based’ uses the raw ﬁrm-
level real gross value added data, for better comparison with the available U.S. evidence. ‘Manufacturing ASM
Ouptut-based’ is the 1973-2005 IQR series for ﬁrm-level output growth rates in the Annual Survey of Manufactur-
ers, available from http ://www.stanf ord.edu/ nbloom/index_f iles/Page315.htm.
16We note that German business cycle statistics look rather similar to those in the U.S., which is at least prima
facie inconsistent with risk ﬂuctuations being important and different in the two countries.
23Table 6 compares our results with the available limited U.S. evidence and shows that both
economieshavesimilarﬁrm-levelriskprocesses. Theﬁrstimportantfacttonoteisthatallmea-
sures of ﬁrm-level risk are countercyclical. Second, volatility of the cross-sectional interquartile
range of output growth from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers, 9.80%, is close to the corre-
sponding number in the USTAN data, 8.00%. Third, this table also shows in rows one and two
that focusing on manufacturing is likely to lead to an overestimation of ﬁrm-level risk ﬂuctua-
tions. The USTAN data set allows for a comparison of the extent of ﬁrm-level risk ﬂuctuations
across industries and our analysis demonstrates that manufacturing is different from services.
The combined retail and wholesale trade sector, for example, features a similar volatility and
cyclicality of risk as the overall USTAN data set (see Table 8 in Appendix A.1). The combined
transportationandcommunicationsectorhassomewhathigherriskvolatility(albeitlowerthan
manufacturing),butﬁrm-levelriskisessentiallyacyclicalthere. Restrictingtheanalysistoman-
ufacturing data is thus problematic and even more so in the U.S., where this industry has an
even smaller share in aggregate production and employment than it has in Germany. Finally,
Table6showsthatthelowerandupperboundscenariosweuse–halfandquadrupletheCVrisk
of the baseline scenario – comfortably cover the available U.S. evidence.
6 Conclusion
This paper argues that shocks to ﬁrm-level risk, mediated through physical capital adjustment
frictions, are unlikely to be major drivers of the business cycle. We arrive at this conclusion
by studying a heterogeneous-ﬁrm dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with persis-
tent idiosyncratic shocks, ﬁxed capital adjustment costs and time-varying ﬁrm-level risk. We
discipline the model using a rich German ﬁrm-level data set. The model features the ‘wait-and-
see’ property for investment after surprise increases in ﬁrm-level risk that the recent literature
has highlighted. We focus on the unconditional business cycle dynamics generated by ﬁrm-
level risk ﬂuctuations. On its own, time-varying ﬁrm-level risk does not produce quantitatively
realistic year-to-year business cycle ﬂuctuations, and when juxtaposed to standard aggregate
productivity shocks it does little to alter these ﬂuctuations. We leave open the possibility that
in different model environments and/or for speciﬁc historical episodes risk shocks are impor-
tant for understanding aggregate developments (see Arellano et. al., 2010, Gilchrist, Sim and
Zakrajsek, 2010, as well as Schaal, 2010).
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27A Appendix - Data
A.1 Description of the Sample
Our ﬁrm-level data source is USTAN (Unternehmensbilanzstatistik) of Deutsche Bundesbank,
which is a large annual ﬁrm-level balance sheet data base. It provides annual ﬁrm level data
from 1971 to 1998 from the balance sheets and the proﬁt and loss accounts of over 60,000 ﬁrms
per year. It originated as a by-product of the Bundesbank’s rediscounting and lending activities.
Bundesbank law required the Bundesbank to assess the creditworthiness of all parties backing
a commercial bill put up for discounting. It implemented this regulation by requiring balance
sheet data of all parties involved. These balance sheet data were then archived and collected
into a database (see Stoess (2001) and von Kalckreuth (2003) for details).
Although the sampling design – one’s commercial bill being put up for discounting – does
not lead to a perfectly representative selection of ﬁrms in a statistical sense, the coverage of the
sample is very broad. USTAN covers incorporated ﬁrms as well as privately-owned companies.
Its industry coverage – while still somewhat biased towards manufacturing ﬁrms – includes the
construction, the service as well as the primary sectors. The following Table 7 displays the
industry coverage of our ﬁnal baseline sample.
Table 7: INDUSTRY COVERAGE
One-digit Industry Firm-year observations Percentage
Agriculture 12,291 1.44
Mining & Energy 4,165 0.49
Manufacturing 405,787 47.50
Construction 54,569 6.39
Trade (Retail & Wholesale) 355,208 41.59
Transportation & Communication 22,085 2.59
While there remains a bias towards larger and ﬁnancially healthier ﬁrms, the size coverage
is still fairly broad: 31% of all ﬁrm-year observations in our ﬁnal baseline sample have less than
20 employees and 57% have less than 50 employees. In terms of ownership structure, only 2%
of ﬁrm-year observations are from publicly traded ﬁrms, just under 60% from limited liability
companies and just under 40% from private ﬁrms with fully liable partners. Finally, the Bun-
desbank itself frequently uses the USTAN data for its macroeconomic analyses and for cross-
checking national accounting data. We take this as an indication that the bank considers the
data as sufﬁciently representative and of high quality. This makes the USTAN data a suitable




data by the implicit deﬂator for gross value added from the German national accounts.
Capital is deﬂated with one-digit industry- and capital-good speciﬁc investment good price
deﬂatorswithinaperpetualinventorymethod. Similarly,werecovertheamountoflaborinputs
fromwagebills(wecalculateanaveragewageforcellsofﬁrmsdescribedbyindustry,year,ﬁrm-
size, and region and then divide the payroll by this average), as information on the number
of employees is only updated infrequently for some companies. Finally, the ﬁrm-level Solow
residual is calculated from data on real gross value added and factor inputs.
We remove outliers according to the following procedure: we calculate log changes in real
gross value added, the Solow residual, real capital and employment, as well as the ﬁrm-level
investment rate and drop all observations where a change falls outside a three standard devia-
tionsintervalaroundtheyear-speciﬁcmean. Wealsodropthoseﬁrmsforwhichwedonothave
at least ﬁve observations in ﬁrst differences. This leaves us with a sample of 854,105 ﬁrm-year
observations, which corresponds to observations on 72,853 ﬁrms, i.e. the average observation
length of a ﬁrm in the sample is 11.7 years. The average number of ﬁrms in the cross-section of
any given year is 32,850. Details on the implementation as well as the representativeness of the
resulting sample can be found in Bachmann and Bayer (2011).
A.2 The Measurement of Firm-Level Risk
A.2.1 Dispersion of Innovations in Measured Firm-Level Solow Residuals
We model ﬂuctuations in idiosyncratic risk as ﬂuctuations in the cross-sectional standard de-
viation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc innovations to Solow residuals. Our ﬁrst step is thus to calculate ﬁrm-
speciﬁc Solow residuals. In accordance with our model, we use the Cobb-Douglas production




where ²i,t is ﬁrm-speciﬁc and zt aggregate productivity. We assume that labor input ni,t is im-
mediatelyproductive,whereascapitalki,t ispre-determinedandinheritedfromlastperiod. We
estimate the output elasticities of the production factors, º and µ, as median shares of factor
expenditures over gross value added within each industry. We use log-differences in the Solow
residual to capture Solow residual innovations, as the persistence of ﬁrm-level Solow residuals
is high, close to a unit root.
Table 8 displays the cyclical properties of the cross-sectional standard deviation of mea-
sured Solow residual innovations for various ways of cutting the sample and treating the data.
29Table 8: THE CYCLICAL PROPERTIES OF std(¢log²i,t)
Speciﬁcation CV (std(¢log²i,t)) Correl(std(¢log²i,t),
HP(100)¡Y )
Raw data 2.89% -0.45
Industry and ﬁrm ﬁxed effects removed 2.67% -0.48
Two observations of ﬁrst differences 2.33% -0.43
Twenty observations of ﬁrst differences 5.42% -0.29
Smallest 25% ﬁrms (capital) 1.97% -0.40
Largest 5% ﬁrms (capital) 5.41% -0.41
Size weighted (capital) 5.92% -0.68
Publicly traded 5.03% -0.27
Limited liability 3.44% -0.45
Privately owned 2.72% -0.40
Manufacturing 3.83% -0.57
Trade 2.86% -0.22
Transportation and Communication 3.20% 0.20
Constant material intensity 4.57% -0.26
Notes: the ﬁrst column displays the time series coefﬁcient of variation of the cross-sectional standard deviation
of ﬁrm-speciﬁc Solow residual innovations. The second column displays the time series correlation of this cross-
sectional standard deviation with HP(100)-ﬁltered aggregate real gross value added for the nonﬁnancial private
business sector. The ﬁrst row, ‘Raw data’, is the baseline relative to which the other rows of the table change.
The ﬁrst row of Table 8, ‘Raw data’, is the baseline relative to which the other rows change.17
For the second row we remove ﬁrm ﬁxed and industry-year effects from these ﬁrst-difference
variables to focus on idiosyncratic ﬂuctuations that do not capture differences in industry-
speciﬁc responses to aggregate shocks or permanent ex-ante ﬁrm heterogeneity. The small dif-
ferences between the ﬁrst and second row indicate that the raw data are indeed mostly driven
by truly idiosyncratic shocks.
For a ﬁrm to be in our baseline sample, we required it to have at least ﬁve observations in
ﬁrst differences of payroll, gross value added and capital stocks. When we focus on ﬁrms that
are in the data base for almost the entire time horizon, i.e. for twenty observations in ﬁrst dif-
ferences, the volatility of ﬁrm-level risk almost doubles. The reason for this is explained in the
next two panels of Table 8, which, respectively, analyze the time series properties of ﬁrm risk by
ﬁrm-size and ownership. It is indeed large and publicly traded ﬁrms that display stronger risk
ﬂuctuations than smaller and privately owned ones. Since smaller ﬁrms seem to face weaker
17Wealsoexploredifferentsubsamples,forexampleonlythepre-reuniﬁcationperiod,industry-speciﬁcdeﬂators
for ﬁrm-level gross value added and various ways to remove outliers – 2.5 and 5 standard deviations or, alterna-
tively, the largest 1% and 5% of observations. None have any signiﬁcant effect on the results.
30ﬂuctuations in risk,18 our baseline sample in which small ﬁrms are underrepresented (and in-
deed all data sets with an overrepresentation of large and or publicly traded ﬁrms) is likely to
yield an overestimation of the true cyclical risk ﬂuctuations.
Thenexttolastpaneltellsacautionarytaleaboutrelyingexclusivelyonmanufacturingdata
when measuring ﬁrm-level risk ﬂuctuations. In services, ﬁrm-level risk is either less volatile
than in manufacturing (‘Trade’) or not countercyclical (‘Transportation and Communication’).
Finally, in any Solow residual calculation that is based on a simple Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion function with only labor and capital, there is the potential problem of attributing optimal
changes in utilization, hours per worker or effort to random productivity changes and therefore
of overstating (average) ﬁrm-level risk. Using ideas from Basu (1996), we calculate the disper-
sion of the Solow residual innovations for those ﬁrms that keep the intensity of material usage
constant between two periods, i.e. ﬁrms for which the fraction of material usage to sales does
notchange. Onecanseethatthecoefﬁcientofvariationgoesupbutitisstillbelowtheestimate
for large ﬁrms.
In the reminder of this subsection, we check whether the particular sample selection of the
USTAN data has any impact on our ﬁndings. Clementi and Palazzo (2010) show in a struc-
tural model with ﬁrm entry and exit that selection on productivity would produce procyclical
measured risk ﬂuctuations in an actually homoskedastic world. This result provides some indi-
cation that our ﬁndings are not driven by selection on productivity. The econometric evidence
conﬁrms this.
The sample consists of those ﬁrms whose bills of exchange were put up for discounting at
the Bundesbank. These are likely to be ﬁnancially healthier and more productive than the aver-
age ﬁrm. However, this implies a bias for our results only if the level of productivity or ﬁnancial
health predicts productivity changes. To asses whether such a bias is present, we estimate the
following simple Heckman (1976)-selection model with a maximum likelihood estimator for
each year t Æ1973,...,1998. We take all ﬁrms present in t ¡1 and observe the estimated level of
theSolowresidual ˆ ²i,t¡1.Weassumethattheselectiontoremaininthesampleattime t isbased
on a latent variable #i,t composed of current productivity ®²i,t and some normally distributed
noise term ui,t.
#it Æ®²i,t Åui,t Æ®²i,t¡1Åui,t Å®¢²i,t | {z }
Æ´i,t
Moreover, we assume that productivity follows a random walk whose increments ¢²i,t Æ vi,t
will be correlated with the composed error term of the selection equation, ´i,t Æui,t Å®vi,t. We
18Bachmann and Bayer (2011) show that they have higher average risk.
31assume that vi,t is orthogonal to ²i,t¡1. Let mt be the expected growth rate of ²i,t, then:
¢²i,t Æmt Åvit.
A (latent) random walk fulﬁls the exclusion restriction necessary to use the Heckman estimator
with ²i,t¡1 being independent of the innovation vi,t and thus a valid instrument for selection. It
is indeed more likely for the ﬁrm to remain in the sample with higher levels of ²i,t¡1. However,
this does not inﬂuence the estimated variance of vit, ˆ ¾ML
v (t). Its correlation with the sample
variance std(¢log²i,t) is almost perfect and the cyclical properties of ˆ ¾ML
v (t) are almost iden-
tical to those of std(¢log²i,t), namely: CV Æ 2.63% vs. CV Æ 2.67% and a cyclicality of ¡0.44
versus ¡0.48.19 We conclude that, although the sample is clearly no random sample with re-
spect to productivity levels, it is sufﬁciently random with respect to productivity changes.
A.2.2 Dealing with Measurement Error
Measured Solow residuals will reﬂect true ﬁrm productivity only with error. We take this into
account and assume that measured Solow residuals ˆ ²i,t are composed of the true productivity
²i,t thatfollowsarandomwalkandawhite-noiseerrortermui,t.Weassumethatui,t hasatime-
constant variance ¾2
u, while the innovations to ²i,t, vi,t, have a time-varying variance ¾2
v (t).






































{[ˆ s1(t)Å ˆ s1(t Å1)]¡ ˆ s2(t)}.
19We used the case with industry and ﬁrm ﬁxed effects removed for this analysis.
32This estimated measurement error is then subtracted from the variance of measured Solow
residuals ˆ s1(t) in order to obtain an estimate of the variance of productivity innovations:
ˆ ¾2





{[ˆ s1(t)Å ˆ s1(t Å1)]¡ ˆ s2(t)}. (10)
We take (10) as our measure of ﬁrm-level risk, which is depicted in Figure 5 below, together
with average ﬁrm-level productivity and aggregate output.
Table 9: THE CYCLICAL PROPERTIES OF FIRM-LEVEL RISK
Speciﬁcation CV (risk) Correl(risk,
HP(100)¡Y )
Baseline - FE and ME 4.72% -0.47
Smallest 25% ﬁrms (capital) - LB 1.97% -0.40
Size weighted (capital) - FE and ME - UB 8.38% -0.62
Raw - ME 4.10% -0.44
20 obs. of ﬁrst differences - FE and ME 7.26% -0.38
Largest 5% ﬁrms (capital) - FE and ME 7.28% -0.46
Manufacturing - FE and ME 6.08% -0.61
Publicly traded - FE and ME 7.34% -0.29
20 obs. of ﬁrst differences manufacturing - FE and ME 7.52% -0.50
Notes: the ﬁrst column displays the time series coefﬁcient of variation of the cross-sectional standard deviation of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc Solow residual growth purged of measurement error (‘ME’) and ﬁrm-speciﬁc as well as industry-year




lower bound calibration scenario loosely on the second row, which displays the cyclical prop-
erties of ﬁrm-level risk for small ﬁrms, which are underrepresented in USTAN, and using the
raw data, which are based on a minimum amount of assumptions. We base our upper bound
calibration scenario loosely on the third row, which delivers the strongest risk ﬂuctuations. To
be conservative we roughly double this value when computing the upper bound models. Inter-
estingly, combining features that increase risk ﬂuctuations, such as ‘being almost always in the
sample’ and ‘being in manufacturing’ (see Table 8 in the previous subsection), does not sub-
stantially increase the volatility of risk over and above what one of these features alone does
(see the last row of Table 9). Any other combination would not have left sufﬁcient data to yield
reliable results.
Figure 5 depicts the time series of ﬁrm-level productivity risk, average productivity and
cyclical aggregate output.
33Figure 5: Time Series of Firm-Level Risk, Average Productivity and Cyclical Aggregate Output

















Notes: ‘Firm-Level Risk’, the solid line, is the time series of our baseline measure of ﬁrm-level risk, linearly de-
trended and normalized by time-average risk. ‘Average Productivity’, the dotted line, is the time series of ﬁrm-level
average productivity, linearly detrended. ‘HP(100)-Y’ is HP(100)-ﬁltered aggregate real gross value added for the
nonﬁnancial private business sector.
34B Appendix - Robustness
The following tables display results from simulations of our model for (i) a different timing as-
sumption for when ﬁrms learn the dispersion of idiosyncratic shocks, (ii) aggregate productiv-
ity being calibrated from aggregate Solow residuals, (iii) a calibration with higher ﬁxed costs of
capital adjustment and (iv) a calibration with deterministic ﬁxed costs of adjustment.
Table 10: AGGREGATE BUSINESS CYCLE STATISTICS FOR THE ‘FULL MODEL’ - DIFFERENT TIMING
FOR RISK
Full Model Full Model RBC Model Data
Diff. Timing Baseline
Volatility
of Output 2.25% 2.26% 2.26% 2.30%
Volatility of aggregate variables relative to output volatility
Consumption 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.78
Investment 3.68 3.74 3.70 1.90
Employment 0.58 0.60 0.59 0.78
Persistence
Output 0.42 0.41 0.42 0.48
Consumption 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.67
Investment 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.42
Employment 0.34 0.33 0.35 0.61
Contemporaneous Correlation with Aggregate Output
Consumption 0.92 0.91 0.92 0.66
Investment 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.83
Employment 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.68
Contemporaneous Correlation with Aggregate Consumption
Investment 0.80 0.77 0.80 0.60
Employment 0.75 0.70 0.75 0.36
Notes: ‘FullModel-Baseline’referstoasimulation, wheretherearetwoorthogonalaggregateshocks, to z and¾(²0).
This is the baseline model discussed in Section 4.2. ‘Full Model-Baseline’ and ‘Full Model-Diff. Timing’ differ in
that the latter allows agents to know only ¾(²) (and not ¾(²0)). ‘RBC Model’ refers to a simulation, where the only
aggregate shock is to z; obviously, here there is no timing issue. ‘Data’ refers to the nonﬁnancial private business
sector’s aggregates.
35Table 11: AGGREGATE BUSINESS CYCLE STATISTICS FOR THE ‘FULL MODEL’ - AGGREGATE SOLOW
RESIDUALS
Full Model RBC Model Full Model RBC Model Data
Aggr. SR Aggr. SR Baseline Baseline
Volatility
of Output 2.34% 2.34% 2.26% 2.26% 2.30%
Volatility of aggregate variables relative to output volatility
Consumption 0.41 0.41 0.50 0.50 0.78
Investment 4.19 4.18 3.74 3.70 1.90
Employment 0.69 0.68 0.60 0.59 0.78
Persistence
Output 0.30 0.31 0.41 0.42 0.48
Consumption 0.55 0.55 0.59 0.59 0.67
Investment 0.23 0.25 0.34 0.35 0.42
Employment 0.22 0.24 0.33 0.35 0.61
Contemporaneous Correlation with Aggregate Output
Consumption 0.87 0.88 0.91 0.92 0.66
Investment 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.83
Employment 0.95 0.96 0.93 0.94 0.68
Contemporaneous Correlation with Aggregate Consumption
Investment 0.73 0.75 0.77 0.80 0.60
Employment 0.68 0.71 0.70 0.75 0.36
Notes: see notes to Table 10. ‘Full Model-Aggr. SR’ refers to a simulation, where there are two orthogonal aggregate
shocks, to z and ¾(²0), but in contrast to the baseline case we use Solow residuals calculated from German industry
national accounting data that correspond to the nonﬁnancial private business sector to calibrate the exogenous
aggregate process. We use ºÆ0.5565 and µ Æ0.2075. ‘RBC Model-Aggr. SR’ is the analog of ‘RBC Model-Baseline’,
again with Solow residuals from national account data. The ﬂuctuations of z in ‘Full Model-Aggr. SR’ have been
rescaled to roughly match the volatility of output. ‘RBC Model-Aggr. SR’ uses the same rescaling factor.
36Table 12: AGGREGATE BUSINESS CYCLE STATISTICS FOR THE ‘FULL MODEL’ - HIGHER ADJUST-
MENT COSTS
Full Model RBC Model Full Model RBC Model Data
High AC High AC Baseline Baseline
Volatility
of Output 2.16% 2.16% 2.26% 2.26% 2.30%
Volatility of aggregate variables relative to output volatility
Consumption 0.54 0.54 0.50 0.50 0.78
Investment 3.48 3.41 3.74 3.70 1.90
Employment 0.56 0.54 0.60 0.59 0.78
Persistence
Output 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.42 0.48
Consumption 0.54 0.55 0.59 0.59 0.67
Investment 0.34 0.36 0.34 0.35 0.42
Employment 0.33 0.36 0.33 0.35 0.61
Contemporaneous Correlation with Aggregate Output
Consumption 0.94 0.95 0.91 0.92 0.66
Investment 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.83
Employment 0.93 0.95 0.93 0.94 0.68
Contemporaneous Correlation with Aggregate Consumption
Investment 0.81 0.86 0.77 0.80 0.60
Employment 0.75 0.81 0.70 0.75 0.36
Notes: see notes to Table 10. ‘Full Model-High AC’ refers to a simulation, which is similar to ‘Full Model-Baseline’,
buttheupperadjustmentcostfactor, ¯ »,isquadrupled. ‘RBCModel-HighAC’istheanalogof‘RBCModel-Baseline’,
again with quadrupled adjustment costs.
37Table 13: AGGREGATE BUSINESS CYCLE STATISTICS FOR THE ‘FULL MODEL’ - DETERMINISTIC
ADJUSTMENT COSTS
Full Model RBC Model Full Model RBC Model Data
Det. AC Det. AC Baseline Baseline
Volatility
of Output 2.30% 2.31% 2.26% 2.26% 2.30%
Volatility of aggregate variables relative to output volatility
Consumption 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.78
Investment 3.84 3.81 3.74 3.70 1.90
Employment 0.63 0.61 0.60 0.59 0.78
Persistence
Output 0.41 0.42 0.41 0.42 0.48
Consumption 0.61 0.62 0.59 0.59 0.67
Investment 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.42
Employment 0.31 0.34 0.33 0.35 0.61
Contemporaneous Correlation with Aggregate Output
Consumption 0.89 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.66
Investment 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.83
Employment 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.68
Contemporaneous Correlation with Aggregate Consumption
Investment 0.73 0.76 0.77 0.80 0.60
Employment 0.66 0.70 0.70 0.75 0.36
Notes: see notes to Table 10. ‘Full Model-Det. AC’ refers to a simulation, which is similar to ‘Full Model-Baseline’,
but adjustment costs are deterministic. ‘RBC Model-Det. AC’ is the analog of ‘RBC Model-Baseline’, again with
deterministic adjustment costs. Adjustment costs are again calibrated to match a weighted quadratic form in the
skewness and kurtosis of the average investment rate distribution (see Section 3). The ﬂuctuations of z in ‘Full
Model-Det. AC’ have been rescaled to roughly match the volatility of output. ‘RBC Model-Det. AC’ uses the same
rescaling factor.
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